The Situationist

Posts Tagged ‘Ideology’

Judicial Ideology – Abstract

Posted by The Situationist Staff on December 29, 2008

Judicial PoliticsBryan D. Lammon has posted his paper “What We Talk about When We Talk about Ideology: Judicial Politics Scholarship and Naive Legal Realism (forthcoming 83 St. John’s Law Review (2009)) on SSRN.  Here’s the abstract.

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A large and growing body of law and psychology scholarship has posed new challenges to traditional assumptions about the behavior of legal actors. While mainstream legal thought has often treated individuals as more or less rational, autonomous actors, scholars in a variety of fields are presenting a new, empirically based, and more formal challenge to the law’s traditional conceptions of human behavior. One area with especially great potential is the use of psychology to improve our understanding of one of the more persistent questions of legal theory: How do judges decide cases? While law and psychology scholars are changing the way we think about the behavior of legal actors, the psychology of judicial behavior has gone relatively unexplored.

However, another school of thought on judicial behavior has made recent inroads into legal scholarship. In a field commonly known as “judicial politics,” political scientists (and more recently, legal scholars) have endeavored to uncover the determinants of judicial behavior using the tools of statistical analysis. While a few legal scholars outside of judicial politics have suggested that it should inform legal theory judicial politics as a field of study has been embraced by a few, regarded as unremarkable or obvious by some, and rejected by others. I suspect that this mixed reception is due in part to much of the scholarship being somewhat unclear in what it exactly means. That is, much of political science scholarship quite clearly suggests that judging is ideological. What “ideological” means, however, is much less clear. A bit of reading between the lines reveals that much of judicial politics scholarship conceives of ideology predominantly as partisan politics. Along these lines, much of the scholarship presents an image of judges as consciously and actively promoting a political agenda.

This conception of ideology and ideological judicial decisionmaking, however, is quite unsatisfying. It conceives of ideology predominantly in political or partisan terms, and, bearing the influence of traditional notions of individual rationality and autonomy, it portrays judges as rational actors that can consciously impose their policy preferences through their decisions. This portrayal reflects the same conception of rational, wholly autonomous individual behavior that law and psychology is challenging. However, even if one rejects judicial politics’ conception of ideology and its influence, one still must contend with the reams of empirical research that judicial politics scholars have amassed.

This lack of clarity coupled with scores of empirical studies that one cannot easily dismiss creates a number of problems for legal scholars. First, judicial politics effectively characterizes judicial decisionmaking as party politics. In so doing, it misunderstands the human side of judging and perverts our understanding of judicial behavior. Second, as noted above, some legal scholars are calling for the incorporation of judicial politics scholarship into legal scholarship. Yet, before turning to the normative implications of judicial politics scholarship, it is important to clarify what exactly this scholarship means. Finally, the language and conclusions of judicial politics scholarship enflame the myth of judicial activism.

In this Article, I look to the social psychological theory of naive realism in order to understand the empirical findings of judicial politics scholarship. Naive realism begins with the social psychological truism that all perception is subjective. However, we often fail to recognize the subjectivity of our own perception, instead believing that we are privy to the objective realities of the outside world. The problem of this disparity between how we think we see the world (objectively) and how we really see the world (subjectively) is that we often fail to appreciate the subjectivity of both our own and others’ perception. An appreciation of the subjectivity of perception central to naive realism indicates that what might appear to be political or partisan or “ideological” decisionmaking is instead the result of the inevitable influence of human decisionmakers perceiving their world subjectively.

This Article, however, is not confined to an internal debate between two approaches to judicial behavior – one based in psychology and one based in political science. In this Article, I also hope to show how the study of judicial behavior can inform legal theory. Throughout this piece, I hope to show how modern psychology can inform wider perspectives on judicial decisionmaking and legal theory in general.

Posted in Abstracts, Ideology, Law, Legal Theory, Politics, Social Psychology | Tagged: , , , , | 1 Comment »

John Jost on Political Psychology

Posted by The Situationist Staff on December 15, 2008

jostHere is an excellent interview of Situationist contributor John Jost by an intern from the Breakthrough Institute.

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Why is the study of political psychology important?

At its best, political psychology has the potential to improve, on the basis of reason and evidence, our political institutions and public policies so that they are more congruent with what we know about human behavior.  Social and political psychologists have, over the decades, offered sophisticated analyses and practical interventions with regard to stereotyping, prejudice, authoritarianism, sexism, aggression, nationalism, terrorism, war, and conflict resolution.  [See Political Psychology book here.]

You conclude that fear motivates conservatism, but does this mean progressives should avoid fear-based appeals entirely? What about when dealing with genuinely scary things like terrorism and global warming?

For decades social psychologists have known that fear-based appeals in and of themselves are unhelpful and counterproductive, because they lead people either to deny problems that are too painful to face or to simply feel helpless and incapacitated.  I think that we see both of these responses to the threat of global warming all the time.  So, if you use a fear-based appeal you must simultaneously provide people with a clear, constructive solution to the problem.

In general, conservatives are much better than progressives at doing that, maybe because progressives tend to get bogged down in a complex, overly nuanced analysis of the problem.  “We’ll kill all the terrorists,” may be an unrealistic goal (even setting aside the question of whether it’s a desirable goal), but it does assuage the fear, at least temporarily, in clear and unambiguous terms.  Even with regard to global warming, conservatives (when they admit the problem) state simply that, “The market will fix it.”  That’s simple and makes people feel better in the short run, even if it turns out to be false.  Progressives who use fear-based appeals need to get better at communicating a clear (and reassuring) solution whenever the threat is made salient.  Otherwise, I think that it will backfire.

What are some examples of the ways progressives have dealt with fear effectively?

I think that in the U.S. context, the best historical example is probably Franklin D. Roosevelt, who famously declared in 1933, at the height of the Great Depression, “We have nothing to fear but fear itself.”  This statement reframes the whole question of what the real threat is, highlighting the fact that fear can be a truly destructive political force, and that it can erode democratic systems from within, as Roosevelt was about to see with respect to Europe.

But Roosevelt did not stop at the level of rhetoric.  He proceeded to roll out dozens of specific social and economic programs that were clearly designed to address the economic fears of the citizenry.  For the most part he presented these solutions in clear, confident, certain terms.  The solutions he proposed were unabashedly liberal, and he explained why they were good solutions for the problems that faced the nation.  In other words, he promised to solve the problems and, in many ways, he did.

What kind of response does your work get from conservatives?

Conservatives are typically more bothered by oversimplified (mis)representations that sometimes spread through the media (especially the blogosphere), than by the actual details of our research.  Once they learn about it, conservatives are prone to concede that there are personality and/or cognitive style differences between liberals and conservatives.  There is obviously a difference between saying that conservatives score higher (on average) than liberals on personal needs for order or structure and saying that conservatives are stupid or crazy, but some people can’t (or, more likely, don’t want to) grasp the difference.

There are several ironies concerning the most hostile responses, though.  Some people send hate mail that tends to confirm the worst, most authoritarian picture one could have of extreme conservatives.  They are hardly helping their cause, it seems to me.  Other negative responses in the blogosphere run the gamut from “ho hum,” “this is obvious,” and “we already knew this” to “this is outrageous” and “what bullshit.”  Well, it can’t be both trivially true and spectacularly false.  We need to conduct research in psychology because everyone thinks they know what really drives their own behavior (and that of others) and also because nearly everything about psychology sounds obvious once you know it to be true.

One might conclude from your study that conservatism is almost an aberrant behavior — a coping mechanism of sorts. Was this your intention?

No, I think that comes from a fundamental misunderstanding of psychology as a discipline; people assume that if psychologists are studying it, then it must be pathological in some way.  In fact the opposite is probably closer to the truth in this case.  Conservatism is intuitive, ordinary, commonplace, and probably has natural psychological advantages over liberalism.  It makes a great deal of sense that when people feel threatened they would stick to what is familiar and known, that is, the status quo.  All of us, even progressives, want to feel good about most of the customs, traditions, and institutions that surround us, and it can be a painful, disillusioning process when we feel disappointed in our country, its leaders, and its institutions.

To use one of the terms that is central to our research program, I think that everyone is motivated—at least to some degree—to engage in “system justification.”  In this respect, I think that liberals and progressives are probably at a disadvantage.  The notion that we should tolerate and respect people who are different from us and that we should offer equal protection even to those who reject or flout traditional norms is somewhat counterintuitive, in a psychological sense.  In the context of human history as a whole, this liberal, tolerant, open-minded, egalitarian view is newer and far more of an “aberration.”  As a philosophical belief system or a cultural innovation, it could be considered an accomplishment of our species, insofar as it was unlikely to catch on given our evolutionary background.

You posit that “resistance to change” and “acceptance of inequality” are the core dimensions of conservative thought. What are the core dimensions of liberal and progressive thought?

Actually, what we say is that at the core of the left-right (or liberal-conservative) distinction there are two basic values or polar orientations: (1) advocating vs. resisting social change, and (2) rejecting vs. accepting social and economic inequality.  These two aspects tend to be correlated because traditional social arrangements were hierarchical and authority-based, and over the last several centuries most of the challenges to the status quo have been in the direction of increased rather than decreased egalitarianism.  Thus, as a general rule, leftists are more in favor of social change and egalitarianism (with respect to outcomes as well as opportunities), whereas rightists are more in favor of tradition and more supportive of hierarchical social systems.

9781841690704What do you think are the best practical applications of your research?

One of my former doctoral students, Hulda Thorisdottir, conducted what is probably the best applied test of our ideas in her dissertation work.  She conducted several experiments in which she demonstrated that threatening stimuli (such as frightening movie clips) elicit a temporary increase in closed-mindedness (measured with a subset of items from the “need for cognitive closure” scale) and that increased closed-mindedness was associated with an affinity for conservative policies and opinions.  She also showed that threat can increase approval of liberal policies, but only when those policies are communicated using certainty-oriented language.  That is, liberal opinions must be offered as confident, unambiguously good solutions that will definitely solve the basic problem.  Otherwise, they are dismissed under conditions of threat.

What do you think of the current economic panic in this country? Alan Greenspan recently observed that the current economic mess is “the most wrenching” since World War II; Fortune magazine’s Allan Sloan, who’s been covering the business of business for decades says, “I’m more nervous about the world financial system than I’ve ever been in 40 years.”

Yes, I do think that there are serious economic concerns looming, and the yawning gap between rich and poor has created an opportunity for the country to make an economic left turn.  The Democratic candidate for president should make a note to himself (or herself), just as Bill Clinton did in 1992, that says, “It’s the economy, stupid.”  But I do not think that panic helps progressives, as I said before, because fear inhibits the desire to experiment with bold, new initiatives, and that is the essence of progressive thinking.  Progressives in the 21st century need to be as bold and creative as their predecessors in the last century who made the U.S. a moral leader on the world stage and not just a military and industrial leader.  More than ever, progressives need to offer clear, courageous, and scientifically compelling solutions to the many problems that confront us.  The solutions they propose should be realistic and congruent with what we know about the causes of human behavior; that is, they should be informed by political psychology.

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For related Situationist posts, click here.

Posted in History, Ideology, Politics, Social Psychology, System Legitimacy | Tagged: , , , , , , , | 6 Comments »

Situationism in the News – October

Posted by The Situationist Staff on November 18, 2008

situationism-in-the-news

Below, we’ve posted titles and a brief quotation from some of the Situationist news items of October 2008. (They are listed in alphabetical order by source.)

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From Battle of Ideas: “The dubious science of evolutionary psychology

“Evolutionary psychology prides itself on being a valid, scientific account of human psychology (and behaviour) by tying itself to the scientific theory of natural evolution. But evolution is an explanation of physical, anatomical traits . . . The plausibility of evolutionary psychology rests on the question of whether psychological attributes (patriotism, altruism, romantic love, aesthetic judgments, logical reasoning, recollecting your grandmother’s birthday, and studying to get into college) are analogous to anatomical structures in their origins and in their functioning. If they are not analogous, then it is a mistake to explain them in terms of evolutionary theory which explains physical, anatomical features determined by biological mechanisms.” Read more . . .

From CNN Money: “How to rebuild America

“America can pull through the current economic crisis with a dose of political maturity and a bit of luck. Success will mean the end of the Reagan era, of an ideology that has brought the country to its knees.” Read more . . .

From The Independent: “Scientists prove it really is a thin line between love and hate

“Love and hate are intimately linked within the human brain, according to a study that has discovered the biological basis for the two most intense emotions.” . . . “Scientists studying the physical nature of hate have found that some of the nervous circuits in the brain responsible for it are the same as those that are used during the feeling of romantic love – although love and hate appear to be polar opposites.” Read more . . .

From ObserverThis is Your Brain on Politics

“U.S. presidential candidates have been stumping for nearly two years with their every move being analyzed and reported ad nauseum. Logically, voters should be able to tap into lots of information when they make their decisions come November.  But it turns out there’s a lot more going on when we step behind the curtain to cast our ballot.” Read more . . .

From ScienceNOW: “When the Right Look Trumps the Right Stuff

“Republican vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin received a media lashing last week when word trickled out that her makeup artist snagged $22,800 in the first half of October. Pundits warned that such royal treatment might undermine her “down home” persona, but the makeover may have been a savvy move: New research adds more weight to the idea that voters value attractiveness more than competence in the faces of female politicians.” Read more . . .

From Scientific American: “The Science of Gossip: Why We Can’t Stop Ourselves

“When you cut away its many layers, our fixation on popular culture reflects an intense interest in the doings of other people; this preoccupation with the lives of others is a by-product of the psychology that evolved in prehistoric times to make our ancestors socially successful. Thus, it appears that we are hardwired to be fascinated by gossip.” Read more . . .

Posted in Abstracts, Emotions, Ideology, Life, Politics | Tagged: , , , , , , , | 1 Comment »

Us & Them Politics

Posted by Al Sahlstrom on October 28, 2008

In just over a week, we will see a referendum on “Joe Six-Pack” politics. Over the past decade or two, the Republican Party has promoted a political fiction that conflates wholesomeness, independence, tradition, and common sense with anti-intellectualism and suspicion of outsiders. More recently, Sarah Palin has championed the effort to highlight the supposed division between secular liberal coastal elites and “normal” Americans. By her own words, Palin believes that small towns are “the real America” and she has warned that Barack Obama “is not a man who sees America as you see it and how I see America.” While it might be comforting to dismiss these efforts as a desperate appeal to emotional voters who don’t know or don’t care about the substantive issues in this election, the persistence of these “us vs. them” arguments in our current political paradigm hints at deeper reasons for concern.

Regardless of policy expertise, is there reason to think that makes a difference whether Sarah Palin is a moose-hunting, “Joe Six-Pack” conservative Christian? Yes. Humans are fundamentally social and those distinctions matter – no matter which side of them you may be on. In fact, our affinity for those with similar backgrounds provides an important means of making sense of the world and strengthening ties with others. We have such a natural predisposition for “birds of a feather” to “flock together” that even groups formed with no prior connection among the members (or no meaningful connection at all) can demonstrate a preference for their comrades over those outside the group. Social psychologists call this the “minimal group” paradigm: Individuals randomly assigned to one group over another, absent any rational justification, engage in self-evaluation that favors their new group and strengthens their affiliation with its members. In cultural, family, or political groups, our affiliation with others can provide a comforting means of evaluating the immense, complex web of incomplete information with which we are presented in everyday life. Psychologists have even found that identification of a policy proposal as being from one’s own party can be more determinative of an individual’s approval than the actual content of the proposed policy.

Because our evaluation of policies and political candidates is not purely rational, candidates like Sarah Palin can invoke existing or imagined group affiliations to reframe the political landscape and override other, more rational considerations.

All of this matters because, regardless of who draws the lines in the sand, these tactics do not uniquely manipulate one segment of the country or one end of the political spectrum. Rather they impact all of us by contributing to a situation that alters our perceptions, incites prejudice, and affects behavior across the board. When political tacticians push small town Americans to claim moral superiority over the rest of the country, the resulting climate encourages liberal, college-educated Americans to ignore the complexity in regional and local politics in favor of their own self-serving views. In short, the idea that liberals are more rational or intellectual than conservatives perpetuates a simplistic, partisan view that precludes empathy and interferes with positive change.

It is neither novel nor surprising that this presidential campaign has seen attempts to mobilize support based on identity appeals and false dichotomies. But as we decide which candidate will best face the domestic and international challenges of the next four years, it is worth remembering that our perceptions of those issues and ideas are inherently shaped by how we view ourselves in relation to those with different backgrounds and opposing perspectives. Unless we account for how “Joe Six-Pack” politics manipulate and polarize our political views, Conservatives will never be independent and Liberals will never truly be rational.

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For a related Situationist post, see “Without the Filter.”

Posted in Conflict, Ideology, Politics | Tagged: , , , , , , | 3 Comments »

Take the Policy IAT

Posted by The Situationist Staff on October 8, 2008

The Situationist Staff urges you to urge your friends (and, to those of you who are bloggers, your readers) to take, the “Policy IAT 1.0.”  We are eager to encourage individuals of all political and ideological orientations to take the on-line test designed to examine whether and to what extent people have implicit preferences for certain types of policy options.

To learn more or to take the Policy IAT (a roughly 15-minute task), click here.

Posted in Ideology, Implicit Associations | Tagged: , , | 1 Comment »

The Situation of Judicial Methods – Abstract

Posted by The Situationist Staff on August 16, 2008

Joshua Furgeson, Linda Babcock, and Peter Shane have a fascinating paper, “Behind the Mask of Method” (Ohio State Public Law Working Paper No. 41 (June 2005) – Law Hum. Behav. 2007) on SSRN. Here’s the abstract.

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This empirical paper demonstrates that political orientation affects the interpretive methods (e.g., originalism) that individuals prefer to use to interpret the Constitution. As a consequence, the sworn allegiance of a judge (or judicial candidate) to a particular interpretive methodology, even if faithfully followed, simply cannot guarantee constitutional adjudication that is apolitical in motivation.

The paper begins by recognizing that certain interpretive methods often favor either liberal or conservative policies, and then propose that an individual’s policy goals subconsciously bias their interpretive preferences. We test this hypothesis in two empirical studies. The first study surveys federal law clerks about their interpretive preferences. We find that liberal clerks are significantly more likely than conservative clerks to favor the current meaning of the constitutional text, while conservatives are much more likely to prefer the original meaning. Liberals also prefer to interpret the Constitution a great deal more expansively than conservatives. The second study demonstrates that altering the policy implications of expansive interpretation can shift interpretive preferences, implying that political orientation actually causes, and is not just related to, interpretive preferences.

This relationship between political orientation and interpretive preferences challenges both traditional constitutional jurisprudence and contemporary politics. Interpretive methods are often cited because they appear to provide legal, rather than policy-based, guidance. Consequently, judges often frame their judicial rulings as an application of their interpretive preferences to the facts of the case. More controversially, many judicial nominees have argued that their personal beliefs will be irrelevant to their judicial decisions, as their interpretive preferences will guide them. Our findings imply, however, that judges cannot reduce the influence of their policy preferences by relying on interpretive methods, because their interpretive preferences were likely affected by their policy goals.

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To read some related Situationist posts, see “The Political Situation of Judicial Activism,” “Ideology is Back!,” “The Situation of Judges,” “Blinking on the Bench,” “The Situation of Judging – Part I,” “The Situation of Judging – Part II,” and “Justice Thomas and the Conservative Hypocrisy.”

Posted in Abstracts, Deep Capture, Ideology, Law, Legal Theory, Politics | Tagged: , , , , , | 1 Comment »

Will Wilkinson Interviews Jonathan Haidt

Posted by The Situationist Staff on July 20, 2008

Below is a ten-minute BloggingHeads clip from a one-hour interview of social psychologist Jonathan Haidt.

To watch the entire video, click here. For a sample of related Situationist posts, see “The Motivated Situation of Morality,” Jonathan Haidt on the Situation of Moral Reasoning,” and “Moral Psychology Primer.”

Posted in Ideology, Morality, Video | Tagged: , , , , , , | 2 Comments »

A Convenient Fiction

Posted by Peter Ditto on June 30, 2008

Image by Infinite Jeff - FlickrBeing a traditional liberal academic, there is no love lost between me and the Bush Administration. But social psychological research offers a more nuanced take from others I have heard on what happened in the run up to the Iraq War. It is a take that fits comfortably between the Left’s position that Bush, Cheney and company deliberately manufactured a case for war against Iraq (i.e., they lied), and the Right’s position that any reasonable person would have come to the same conclusion about Iraqi WMDs based on the available intelligence.

The Bush administration clearly wanted to believe that Saddam Hussein had an active WMD program. This belief fit both with their general ideological worldview and their specific foreign policy agenda, and there was obviously some foundation for reasonable people to believe that it might be true. When decision makers approach a judgment with a clear preferred outcome, however, this preference biases the processing of information in subtle, unintentional, but potentially powerful ways. One involves a process I have referred to in the past as motivated skepticism.

Research suggests that information that supports a preferred judgment outcome receives relatively little intellectual challenge and its validity is often accepted at face value. It makes us feel good when information supports what we want to believe, and this dampens our tendency to question it. Information that challenges our preferred conclusion, on the other hand, stimulates a more skeptical response. This information makes us feel bad, and this prods us to question its validity more vigorously. Almost inevitably, uncertainty about unwelcome news arises as no information is completely without flaws or is impervious to alternative explanation.

In short, information we don’t want to believe is simply subjected to a higher standard of proof than is information we do want to believe. This does not occur deliberately, and does not allow us to create support for desired beliefs out of whole cloth. But it does tip the judgment scales in favor of our preferred conclusion, and it does so in a way that is subtle enough not to offend our sense of our own objectivity.

Motivated skepticism seems an apt characterization of how the Bush Administration dealt with the mix of intelligence information they received about Iraqi WMDs during the months prior to the decision to invade. In a 2006 interview with the late Ed Bradley on 60 Minutes (video here), retired CIA official Tyler Drumheller described how individuals who came bearing information supporting the existence of an Iraqi WMD program were accepted as solid informants (even in some cases where their credibility was questionable enough to earn them a nickname like “Curveball”). When informants brought forth information that questioned the WMD theory, however, that information was treated more skeptically, its reliability often questioned because of the lack of a second corroborating informant.

“So you’re saying that if there was a single source and that information from that source backed up the case they were trying to build, then that single source was ok, but if it didn’t, then the single source was not ok, because he couldn’t be corroborated,” Bradley asked in that 60 Minutes interview. “Unfortunately, that’s what it looks like,” Drumheller replied.

What this social psychological analysis suggests then is that the Bush administration did not deliberately construct a case for war that they knew in fact to be false. They believed it all right, and thought they had the data to back it up. But it also most certainly was not the case that their decision making process was untainted by their desire to build a justification for invading Iraq. Instead, it was precisely their fervent desire to believe in an Iraqi WMD program that biased their processing of a quite mixed intelligence picture, sharpening its dull edges in favor of their preferred conclusion. The problem wasn’t that President Bush lied or made up data to support the conclusion he wanted the intelligence to show, but that the decision making process was deeply flawed, with no mechanisms built in to counter the powerful ideological biases the administration should have recognized in itself.

So I don’t want to end by letting Bush et al completely off the hook on this. Ideological bias has been a hallmark of this administration. This has been a top-down presidency, with every decision and every piece of data viewed through (and distorted by) an ideological lens. Whether the issue is climate change, the economy, or the war on terror, the Bush team’s intellectual MO has been to bend the facts to fit their politics.

I have no doubt they believe their political ideology is the correct one, and sincerely view facts that don’t fit within it as flawed (often in their view because of left-biased media and scientific establishments), but this is not an excuse for faulty decision making. Ideological bias is a natural tendency, one that all of us, both left and right, fall prey to at times. But this administration’s particularly willful refusal to live in the reality-based community has had clear costs, and our entrapment in a war launched to combat the convenient fiction of an Iraqi WMD program is one of the big ones.

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To link to a PBS Frontline episode on the decision-making behind how the War on Terror was shifted to Iraq, click here. To read a sample of related Situationist posts, see “The Law and Situation of Military Propaganda,” “March Madness,” “The Situation of Ideology – Part I,” “The Situation of Ideology – Part II,” “Naive Cynicism – Abstract,” “I’m Objective, You’re Biased,” and “Mistakes Were Made (but not be me).”

The Situationist has a series of posts devoted to highlighting some of situational sources of war. Part I and Part II of the series included portions of an article co-authored by Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan Renshon, titled “Why Hawks Win.” Part III reproduced an op-ed written by Situationist friend Dan Gilbert on July 24, 2006. Part IV and Part V in this series contained the two halves of an essay written by Situationist Contributor, Jon Hanson within the week following 9/11. Part VI contains an op-ed written by Situationist Contributor John Jost on October 1, 2001, “Legitimate Responses to Illegitimate Acts,” which gives special emphasis to the role of system justification. Part VII includes a video entitled “Resisting the Drums of War.” The film was created and narrated by psychologist Roy J. Eidelson, Executive Director of the Solomon Asch Center at the University of Pennsylvania.

Posted in Conflict, Ideology, Politics, Social Psychology | Tagged: , , , , , | 4 Comments »

Naive Cynicism – Abstract

Posted by The Situationist Staff on May 8, 2008

Image by Wetsun - FlickrSituationist Contributors Adam Benforado and Jon Hanson have posted their recent article, “Naive Cynicism: Maintaining False Perceptions in Policy Debates” (57 Emory Law Journal (2008)) on SSRN. The paper was recently listed on SSRN’s Top Ten download list for LSPLDL: Political Process, and is a featured article on the Emory Law Journal Website. The abstract is pasted below.

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This is the second article in a multi-part series. In the first part, The Great Attributional Divide, the authors suggested that a major rift runs across many of our major policy debates based on contrasting attributional tendencies (dispositionist and situationist). This article explores how dispositionism maintains its dominance despite the fact that it misses so much of what actually moves us. It argues that the answer lies in a subordinate dynamic and discourse, naïve cynicism: the basic subconscious mechanism by which dispositionists discredit and dismiss situationist insights and their proponents. Without it, the dominant person schema — dispositionism — would be far more vulnerable to challenge and change, and the more accurate person schema — situationism — would be less easily and effectively attacked. Naïve cynicism is thus critically important to explaining how and why certain legal policies manage to carry the day. (To download a copy, click here.)

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For a recent Situationist post illustrating naive cynicism at work, see “Naïve Cynicism in Election 2008: Dispositionism v. Situationism?.”

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Posted in Abstracts, Conflict, Ideology, Legal Theory, Naive Cynicism, Politics, Social Psychology, Uncategorized | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments »

The Great Attributional Divide – Abstract

Posted by The Situationist Staff on April 29, 2008

Image by aaardvaark - FlickrSituationist Contributors Adam Benforado and Jon Hanson have posted their recent article, “The Great Attributional Divide: How Divergent Views of Human Behavior are Shaping Legal Policy” (57 Emory Law Journal (2008)) on SSRN. The paper was recently listed on SSRN’s Top Ten download list for LSPLDL: Political Process, and is a featured article on the Emory Law Journal Website. The abstract is pasted below.

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This article, the first of a multipart series, argues that a major rift runs across many of our major policy debates based on our attributional tendencies: the less accurate dispositionist approach, which explains outcomes and behavior with reference to people’s dispositions (i.e., personalities, preferences, and the like), and the more accurate situationist approach, which bases attributions of causation and responsibility on unseen influences within us and around us. Given that situationism offers a truer picture of our world than the alternative, and given that attributional tendencies are largely the result of elements in our situations, identifying the relevant elements should be a major priority of legal scholars. With such information, legal academics could predict which individuals, institutions, and societies are most likely to produce situationist ideas – in other words, which have the greatest potential for developing the accurate attributions of human behavior that are so important to law. (To download a copy, click here.)

Posted in Abstracts, Ideology, Legal Theory, Life, Naive Cynicism, Social Psychology | Tagged: , , , , , , , | 1 Comment »

 
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