The Situationist

Archive for January, 2009

Situationism in the News

Posted by The Situationist Staff on January 11, 2009

situationism-in-the-news

Below, we’ve posted titles and a brief quotation from some of the Situationist news items that we did not already devote individual posts to from late 2008. (They are listed in alphabetical order by source.)

* * *

From MSNBC: “Julia Roberts was born with a beautiful smile”

“From sneers to full-blown smiles, our facial expressions are hardwired into our genes, suggests a new study.  The researchers compared the facial expressions from more than 4,800 photographs of sighted and blind judo athletes at the 2004 Summer Olympics and Paralympic Games.  The analyses showed sighted and blind individuals modified their expressions of emotion in the same way in accordance with the social context.” Read more . . .

From New York Times: “Four Decades After Milgram, We’re Still Willing to Inflict Pain”

“In 1963, Stanley Milgram, an assistant professor of psychology at Yale, published his infamous experiment on obedience to authority. Its conclusion was that most ordinary people were willing to administer what they believed to be painful, even dangerous, electric shocks to innocent people if a man in a white lab coat told them to.  For the first time in four decades, a researcher has repeated the Milgram experiment to find out whether, after all we have learned in the last 45 years, Americans are still as willing to inflict pain out of blind obedience.” Read more . . .

From Oprah Magazine: How Brain Science May Change the Way We Live

“It’s been only a decade or so since the world got hardwired, “Google” became a verb, and texting turned into a lifestyle. But if you’re still struggling to thumb a message, brace yourself: A whole new revolution in neuroscience is about to shake up our world.” Read more . . .

* * *

To read the previous installment of “Situationism on the News,” click here.

Posted in Abstracts, Life, Neuroscience, Social Psychology | Leave a Comment »

A Neural Perspective on “Efficiency versus Equity” – Abstract

Posted by The Situationist Staff on January 10, 2009

Ming Hsu, Cédric Anen, and Steven R. Quartz, recently published a report titled “The Right and the Good: Distributive Justice and Neural Encoding of Equity and Efficiency” (in 320 Science 1092 – 1095 (2008)).  Here’s the abstract.

* * *

Distributive justice concerns how individuals and societies distribute benefits and burdens in a just or moral manner. We combined distribution choices with functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate the central problem of distributive justice: the trade-off between equity and efficiency. We found that the putamen responds to efficiency, whereas the insula encodes inequity, and the caudate/septal subgenual region encodes a unified measure of efficiency and inequity (utility). Notably, individual differences in inequity aversion correlate with activity in inequity and utility regions. Against utilitarianism, our results support the deontological intuition that a sense of fairness is fundamental to distributive justice but, as suggested by moral sentimentalists, is rooted in emotional processing. More generally, emotional responses related to norm violations may underlie individual differences in equity considerations and adherence to ethical rules.

* * *

For a brief, helpful summary of the report on BPS Research Digest, click here.

Posted in Abstracts, Distribution, Emotions, Neuroscience, Philosophy | Tagged: , , , | Leave a Comment »

Mispredicting Our Reactions to Racism

Posted by The Situationist Staff on January 9, 2009

For more evidence of how of the power of situation and the illusion of disposition, read the following mashup of articles from CNN, Canadian Press, and Associated Press.

* * *

It’s one thing to hear reports of racial slurs being hurled at individuals or to see such epithets in literature or as graffiti on walls. But how would you react if someone used such language in your presence?

Shocked. Disgusted. Outraged. Even horrified, some might say. However, a Canadian-led study suggests real-life responses to prejudice don’t always reflect how people think they will react.

In the study, which appears in Friday’s edition of the journal Science, undergraduate students at Toronto’s York University took part in experiments which cast them in distinct roles: those observing racist remarks first-hand and others who read about such a scenario or watched it unfold on video.

Students were led into a room and seated in a preselected chair thinking they were waiting for an experiment to begin. They were followed into the room by two males posing as participants: one black and one white.

Shortly after, the black male remarks that he has left his cellphone in the hallway, and on his way out to retrieve it gently bumps the white male’s leg with his foot.

Once the black person has left, the white male who’s part of the experiment makes a remark that is either classified as an extreme racist comment [used the N-word], a moderate racist comment or he says nothing at all. The extreme comment used was “clumsy nigger” and the moderate racist comment was “typical, I hate it when black people do that.”

Participants were asked to complete a questionnaire to rate their feelings in the moment and then asked to select a partner to complete a task.

Those who read about or watched the scenario were asked to predict how someone seeing this happen would feel, and whether they would select the white male or black male as a partner.

This group of observers – dubbed “forecasters” – believed people who heard the slurs would be very upset and more likely to pick the black person over the white person.

But in reality, the racist remarks didn’t affect those who heard them first-hand – called “experiencers” – and they were more likely (63 per cent) to select the white person as their lab partner.

“We definitely were surprised,” said lead author and York psychology professor Kerry Kawakami.  “It’s like these nasty racist comments aren’t having an effect.”

“We thought that people would have positive illusions about how they would respond to racism, so that they would predict that they would be much more upset than they were and that they would avoid the white racist more. But we were surprised that it had no impact at all.”

“It didn’t affect them emotionally at all and it didn’t affect their choice of who they wanted to work with at all. Those findings are shocking to everyone in my lab.”

* * *

Kawakami said they are exploring several possibilities as to why individuals would react with such indifference to racist remarks.

One theory is perhaps the nature of the situation was so threatening for participants they simply suppressed all thoughts and emotions. Another is that while people think they’re not prejudiced on a controlled level, on a non-conscious, internal level, they may actually have a lot of negative associations with blacks, she said.

“You’re not going to react negatively towards that person because they’re saying things that you wouldn’t say but that you still might somehow – at least on a non-conscious level – think are true.”

Eliot Smith, a professor of psychological and brain sciences at Indiana University, co-wrote a commentary on the study with Diane Mackie, a psychology professor at University of California, Santa Barbara.

The pair suggest the findings are an example of what is referred to as “a failure of affective forecasting” – people who improperly predict how they would feel and therefore act in imagined or future situations.

Research by Smith and Mackie has explored how emotions affect memberships of social groups that are important to individuals, such as a woman who feels pride if another woman gets a promotion. Smith said it struck them that the new study’s results might be a reflection of that process.

“We definitely found the result very interesting and surprising . . . and we just wanted to put this little twist on it, the idea that sometimes when our emotions do surprise us, it’s a way that we can learn kind of maybe for the first time, what identity we’re in in a particular situation.”

Research also reveals situational cues like things in the environment or that people say can also lead people to switch from one identity to another, he said.

* * *

The study is consistent with decades of psychology research pointing to the same thing: People are really bad at predicting their own actions in socially sensitive situations.

“That point is getting renewed attention as researchers develop more extensive evidence establishing reasons to distrust self-report measures concerning racial attitudes,” said Anthony Greenwald, professor of psychology at the University of Washington, who was not involved with the study.

The racism study harkens back to Stanley Milgram’s famous experiment that began in the early 1960s, in which most people obeyed orders to deliver electric shocks to an innocent person in the next room. Many psychiatrists had predicted that the majority of subjects would stop when the victim protested, but this was not the case.

“The failure of people to confront or do anything about racist comments is pretty widespread in the real world,” said . . . Smith . . . . “People may feel uncomfortable if someone makes a remark like this, but it’s rare they will actually confront them.”

More recent work by Greenwald and colleagues shows that most people — between 75 and 80 percent — have implicit, non-overt prejudices against blacks.

What is responsible for these attitudes? Experts say one culprit is images in television, news and film that portray blacks in a negative light.

“I don’t think what’s in people’s heads is going to change until the environment that places these things in their head has changed,” Greenwald said.

* * *

“It’s important to remind people that just because a black man has been elected as president doesn’t mean racism is no longer a problem or issue in the States,” Kawakami added.

* * *

To learn more about implicit associations, click here. To review previous Situationist posts discussing implicit associations click on the “Implicit Associations” category in the right margin or, for a list of such posts, click here. For a collection of Situationist posts discussing Stanley Milgram’s obedience experiments, click here.

Posted in Abstracts, Choice Myth, Illusions, Implicit Associations, Social Psychology | Tagged: , , | Leave a Comment »

Dan Kahneman on the Situation of Intuition

Posted by The Situationist Staff on January 8, 2009

In Part I of his 2007 Hitchcock Lectures (titled “Explorations of the Mind – Intuition: The Marvels and the Flaws“), Daniel Kahneman explores the idea of intuition:

For a sample of other Situationist posts related to Kahneman’s work, see “Dan Kahneman’s Situation,” “The Situation of Financial Risk-Taking,” “Some (Interior) Situational Sources War – Part I,” and “Some (Interior) Situational Sources War – Part II.”

Posted in Behavioral Economics, Video | Tagged: , , , , , , | 1 Comment »

The Situation of Resolutions

Posted by The Situationist Staff on January 7, 2009

The Party's OverJust one week out into 2009, and many of us are already tripping up on our resolutions.   It’s another case of our disposition being weaker than our situation.  Here are a couple of excerpts that shed some light on the interior situation of our resolve.

* * *

From Sam Sommers’ excellent post “A Once-a-Year Reality Check“:

. . . . I was surprised to hear that one of my aforementioned vital signs was not in the “normal” range one would expect.

* * *

You’d be amazed at the mental gymnastics I went through in order to convince myself that this was some sort of mistake. The room where the screening took place was hot and crowded. They were disorganized enough that they could have transposed digits or confused samples. It was the midterm crunch and I, like everyone else there, was even more stressed than usual. The election was coming up and I had stayed up too late the night before reading polls on line. Seriously. I remember telling myself that.

* * *

We do this type of thing all the time. As many a psychologist has observed and demonstrated empirically, our processes of self-perception are very often less focused on accuracy than on self-enhancement and self-protection.

You could write a blog entry every day for a month on the different mental and behavioral strategies we employ in the effort to continue feeling good about ourselves in the wake of threatening feedback or personal failure: comparing ourselves to people less fortunate than we are; blaming external factors for our own underperformance; putting ourselves in no-lose situations; thinking that we’re better than average at most of the mundane tasks we engage in.

This toolbox of self-deception has a lot to offer. It allows us to remain resilient in the face of our own disappointments. It permits us to bounce back quickly from failure. It gives us the gall to say things like, I know I’m unpopular now, but history will judge me to have been a great leader. And so on.

Of course, as it is with red wine, chocolate, and Jim Carrey movies, these self-serving tendencies have positive effects in moderation, but too much becomes hard to stomach. Keep failing to assume responsibility for outcomes in our lives, and we never seize the opportunity for improvement. Refuse to admit to the reality of our surroundings, and we become unsufferable jerks no one wants to be around.

* * *

From Benedict Carey‘s interesting New York Times article, “Some Protect the Ego by Working on Their Excuses Early.”

This is one reason that genuine excuse artisans — and there are millions of them — don’t wait until after choking to practice their craft. They hobble themselves, in earnest, before pursuing a goal or delivering a performance. Their excuses come preattached: I never went to class. I was hung over at the interview. I had no idea what the college application required.

“This is real self-sabotage, like drinking heavily before a test, skipping practice or using really poor equipment,” said Edward R. Hirt, a psychologist at Indiana University. “Some people do this a lot, and often it’s not clear whether they’re entirely conscious of doing it — or of its costs.”

Psychologists have studied this sort of behavior since at least 1978, when Steven Berglas and Edward E. Jones used the phrase “self-handicapping” to describe students in a study who chose to take a drug that they were told would inhibit their performance on an exam (the drug was actually inert).

The urge goes well beyond a mere lowering of expectations, and it has more to do with protecting self-image than with psychological conflicts rooted in early development, in the Freudian sense. Recent research has helped clarify not just who is prone to self-handicapping but also its consequences — and its possible benefits.

In the original conception, Dr. Berglas and Dr. Jones identified self-handicapping in students who were told they had aced a test made up of impossible-to-answer questions. They had “succeeded” without knowing how or why. “These are the people who are told they are brilliant, without knowing how that inference is derived,” said Dr. Berglas, now an executive coach in the Los Angeles area. He understood the impulse, he said; he himself first experimented with drugs in high school just before taking the SAT, on which he was expected to get a perfect score — a reckless stunt that provided the seed for the theory.

The urge to shoot one’s own foot seems to be stronger in men than in women. In surveys, Dr. Hirt and others have measured the tendency by asking people to rate how well a series of 25 statements describes their own behavior — for example, “I try not to get too intensely involved in competitive activities so it won’t hurt too much if I lose or do poorly.” Men tend to score higher on these measures and, in lab studies, to handicap themselves more severely.

Yet given the opportunity, and a good reason, most people will claim some handicap. In a paper published last summer, Sean McCrea, a psychologist at the University of Konstanz in Germany, described experiments in which he manipulated participants’ scores on a variety of intelligence tests. In some, the subjects could choose to prepare before taking the test or could join the “no practice” group.

Sure enough, Dr. McCrea found that those told they got bad scores blamed a lack of practice, if they could, and that citing this handicap cushioned the blow to their self-confidence.

But the handicap also had another effect. In another experiment, participants who had a good excuse for their poor scores — distracting noises, pumped through headphones they wore during the test — were less motivated to prepare for a subsequent test than those who had no excuse. “The handicap allowed them to say, ‘All things considered, I actually did pretty well,’ ” Dr. McCrea said in a phone interview. “And there’s no drive to get better.”

The burn of embarrassment is, in some sense, the pilot light of motivation.

As a short-term strategy, self-handicapping is often no more than an exercise in self-delusion. Studies of college students have found that habitual handicappers — who skip a lot of classes; who miss deadlines; who don’t buy the textbook — tend to rate themselves in the top 10 percent of the class, though their grades slouch between C and D.

Those who succeed despite their flirtations with disorder typically grow increasingly fond of the handicap itself, whether drink or drugs or defying rules. “With success, expectations go up, and the behavior gets more extreme,” said Dr. Berglas, author of “Reclaiming the Fire: How Successful People Overcome Burnout”. . . .

But the tactic doesn’t fool many people. In a recent study, James C. McElroy of Iowa State University and J. Michael Crant of Notre Dame had 246 adults evaluate the behavior of characters in several workplace anecdotes. The participants’ impressions of a character began to sour after the second time the person cited a handicap.

“What happens here is that if you do it often, observers attribute your performance to you, but begin to view it as part of your disposition, i.e., you’re a whiner,” Dr. McElroy wrote in an e-mail message. “But you can avoid this happening if someone else does the handicapping for you, and surprisingly enough, even if they do it often.”

That, too, is well known among the very best of excuse makers: for best results, recruit an apologist.

Posted in Choice Myth, Life, Positive Psychology | Tagged: , , , | 1 Comment »

Taking Behavioralism Seriously (Part I) – Abstract and Top Ten List

Posted by The Situationist Staff on January 6, 2009

Doug Kysar and Situationist contributor Jon Hanson recently posted on SSRN their important 1999 article, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation (74 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 363) on SSRN. Here is the article’s abstract.

* * *

For the past few decades, cognitive psychologists and behavioral researchers have been steadily uncovering evidence that human decisionmaking processes are prone to nonrational, yet systematic, tendencies. These researchers claim not merely that we sometimes fail to abide by rules of logic, but that we fail to do so in predictable ways.

With a few notable exceptions, implications of this research for legal institutions were slow in reaching the academic literature. Within the last few years, however, we have seen an outpouring of scholarship addressing the impact of behavioral research over a wide range of legal topics. Indeed, one might predict that the current behavioral movement eventually will have an influence on legal scholarship matched only by its predecessor, the law and economics movement. Ultimately, any legal concept that relies in some sense on a notion of reasonableness or that is premised on the existence of a reasonable or rational decisionmaker will need to be reassessed in light of the mounting evidence that humans are “a reasoning rather than a reasonable animal.”

This Article contributes to that reassessment by focusing on the problem of manipulability. Our central contention is that the presence of unyielding cognitive biases makes individual decisionmakers susceptible to manipulation by those able to influence the context in which decisions are made. More particularly, we believe that market outcomes frequently will be heavily influenced, if not determined, by the ability of one actor to control the format of information, the presentation of choices, and, in general, the setting within which market transactions occur. Once one accepts that individuals systematically behave in nonrational ways, it follows from an economic perspective that others will exploit those tendencies for gain.

That possibility of manipulation has a variety of implications for legal policy analysis that have heretofore gone unrecognized. This article highlights some of those implications and makes several predictions that are tested in other work.

* * *

SSRN has just announced its Journal of Behavioral & Experimental Economics and Journal of Behavioral Economics Top Ten lists for papers posted in the last 60 days.  Taking Behavioralism Seriously made both lists.

To download the paper for free click here.  That link will direct you to the abstract and various download options.  To download the companion article, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Som Evidence of Market Manipulation (112 Harvard L. Rev. 1420) click here. For a sample of related Situationist posts, see “Promoting Smoking through Situation” and “The Situation of Subprime Mortgage Contracts – Abstract.”

Posted in Abstracts, Behavioral Economics, Choice Myth, Legal Theory | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a Comment »

Behavioral Economics and Policy

Posted by The Situationist Staff on January 5, 2009

Last month, Rick Montgomery wrote an interesting article, “Behavioral Economics Is Moving from Theory to Policy,” for the Kansas City Star.  Here are some excerpts.

* * *

As the economy sinks and investors buckle over, the behavior buffs are rising up.

From the lesser-appointed corners of academia, psychologists, sociologists and a youthful breed of economists scoff at the revered mathematical models that have driven economic thought and snared Nobel Prizes.

These preachers of “behavioral economics,” including some on President-elect Barack Obama’s economic team, argue that humans cannot be relied upon to obey the efficient, orderly tenets espoused by free-market thinkers.

Chief among the old-school rules is the assumption that we act rationally with money.

“That’s absurd, counterfactual . . . and now they’ve created a catastrophe,” said William Black, who teaches economics and law at the University of Missouri-Kansas City.

Until now, policymakers showed slight regard for the growing field of study into how mortal gaffes and greed intersect with financial decision-making in ways that can punish us all.

Now some close to Obama suggest government’s role is to “nudge” Americans into behaving in economically smarter ways.

“We need a bit more ‘Psych 101’ in addition to ‘Econ 101’ in the design of public policies,” blogged Peter Orszag, the next chief of the Office of Management and Budget, who just turned 40.

Some traditional economists might ask, “And how do you intend to calculate the effects of herd mentality, blind faith or self-destructive foolishness when dealing with a mortgage broker?”

They might cite the gospel that free markets, like celestial bodies in orbit, move in rational and self-correcting ways. Knowing that, who would ever fall for the gravity-defying performance reports of fund manager Bernard Madoff, who claimed double-digit returns year after year after year?

Human beings, that’s who — now shorn of $50 billion.

In October, behavioral scholars were triumphant when the very oracle of the slide-rule set, Alan Greenspan, delivered in Congress what some called a requiem for decades’ worth of economic teaching.

“Those of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholders’ equity — myself, especially — are in a state of shocked disbelief,” the former Federal Reserve chairman conceded.

Why so shocked?

As many see it, a star of Economics 101 known as the “rational actor” abandoned the stage and left markets a mess.

* * *

Across America, collegiate quarrels have been building ever since economists began calling themselves scientists.

Channeling Isaac Newton, those 20th-century purveyors of empirical truths felt they needed formulas to forecast outcomes and solve economic riddles.

Oh, please, murmured many psychologists, sociologists and political scientists. To them, economists were trying to elevate themselves above the murkier, “softer” sciences.

The creation in 1969 of the Nobel Prize in Economic Science put monetary thinkers in the league of the great laureates of medicine and physics.

The second recipient of the prize was Paul A. Samuelson. His 1947 book, Foundations of Economic Analysis, was among the first to pitch sophisticated mathematics as the key to understanding and addressing problems.

Samuelson is 93 now. And what irritates him about the debate over behavioral economics is its either-or tone.

Most of the time, free markets do follow rational, predictable rhythms, Samuelson told The Star. But history has shown that bubbles can build and “the slide-rule guys can’t smooth out those bubbles.”

“A hopelessly addicted centrist (favoring) limited, sensible regulation,” Samuelson blamed “eight terrible years of deregulation” that saw some of Wall Street’s brightest financial engineers tiptoe from the rational realm to the reckless one.

* * *

You can read the entire article here.  For a list of related Situationist posts, click here.

To read some longer law review articles detailing the history of the “competition” between economics, economic behavioralism, and situationism, check out “Legal Academic Backlash: The Response of Legal Theorists to Situationist Insights” (Emory Law Journal, Vol. 57, No. 5, 2008) available on SSRN, “The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal” (Georgetown Law Review, Vol. 93, 2004) available on SSRN,” and “Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation” (New York University Law Review, Vol. 74, 1999) available on SSRN.

Posted in Behavioral Economics, Ideology, Legal Theory, Public Policy | Tagged: , , , , | 2 Comments »

John Darley on “Justice as Intuitions” – Video

Posted by The Situationist Staff on January 3, 2009

plms-logo2

At the 2007 Project on Law and Mind Sciences Conference, John Darley’s talk was titled “Justice as Intuitions.”  Here is the abstract for his talk.

When a person receives a description of an individual committing a specific crime, the person rapidly forms judgments on the severity of the offense and the duration of appropriate punishment for it. Evidence is converging that those judgments are what we would now call “intuitive” judgments. Rather than being the result of a reason-guided, step-by-step analysis, the severity and punishment judgments seem simply to “pop into” the heads of the respondents. Thus, they are similar to the heuristics, biases, and other shortcut decisions that we all use, as documented by the judgment and decision-making researchers. Imaging
research suggests that these intuitions draw on both evaluative and emotional areas of the brain. Behavioral research demonstrates that these intuitions are driven by intuitive ideas of “just deserts” (i.e., retributive reactions rather than more reason-based deterrent or incapacitive considerations). The high degree of consensus within cultures on these judgments
suggests that they are learned through early socialization processes, perhaps building on evolutionarily prepared cognitive structures.

* * *

This “justice as intuitions” account has several implications for the judicial system. Most disturbingly, evidence demonstrates that legal codes that contradict these culturally shared intuitions will move citizens toward moral contempt for the justice system and lessened willingness to voluntarily “obey the law.” Rule-of-law practices need reconsideration in the light of an understanding of the basic shared notions within the population about right and wrong. Finally, we will examine how such actions as “insider trading” can be framed so that citizens will find them appropriately criminalized, and why some public welfare offenses are difficult to intuit as crimes.

Below you can watch a video of Darley’s fascinating presentation (26 minutes).

For related Situationist posts, see Why We Punish,” “Kevin Jon Heller on The Cognitive Psychology of Mens Rea,” and “First Conference on Law and Mind Sciences.”

To watch similar videos, visit the video libraries on the Project on Law and Mind Sciences website (here).

For information on the Third PLMS conference (scheduled for March 7, 2009), click here.

Posted in Abstracts, Emotions, Law, Legal Theory, Morality, Neuroscience, Social Psychology, Video | Tagged: , , , | 1 Comment »

Mark Lanier visits Professor Jon Hanson’s Tort Class (web cast)

Posted by The Situationist Staff on January 1, 2009

Mark Lanier with appleFrom Harvard Law Website:

W. Mark Lanier, the plaintiffs attorney who won a $253 million judgment against pharmaceutical giant Merck & Co. over the fatal effects of its painkiller Vioxx, spoke to Professor Jon Hanson’s Torts class on November 19 at the law school.

Lanier is the founder of the Lanier Law Firm and serves as the Houston firm’s lead litigation counsel. He has won multi-million dollar awards for plaintiffs against such powerful corporations as Merck, Amoco and Becton Dickinson.  has called him “one of the top civil trial lawyers in America.”

Professor Hanson’s Torts 6 class studies the various aspects of tort law, including the psychological, which was the focus of Lanier’s talk. Recounting his trial “war stories” for Hanson’s students, Lanier displayed the “theatrical flair” noted by The Wall Street Journal, which is key to his success in communicating with juries. He changed voices, accents and postures for different characters, and even removed his glasses to reenact the deposition of a witness by another lawyer.

Describing the theory behind his approach, Lanier told the class that plaintiffs litigation is “a bit like professional wrestling meets ballet. The corporations pay for wonderful ballerinas who execute kicks with great precision. We tend to go in as professional wrestlers executing the Texas Tombstone Piledriver. And wrestling beats ballet.” In the Angleton, Texas, trial against Merck, Lanier’s “wrestling” included exhorting jurors to find against Merck with the biblical story of the young David defeating Goliath the giant.

After the class, Professor Hanson commented, “It’s easy to see why Mark is one of the most successful and feared trial attorneys of his generation. His war stories were both eye-opening and spellbinding.”

Lanier is a 1984 graduate of Texas Tech University School of Law and a part-time preacher. In 2006, he was named a Top 10 Trial Attorney as well as one of the 100 Most Influential Lawyers in America by The National Law Journal.

Watch the video

Posted in Events, Law, Video | Tagged: , , | Leave a Comment »

 
Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 827 other followers

%d bloggers like this: