It seems to me that the key difference is in starting points. Gilbert is assuming that climate change is real and significant. He accepts as true the conclusions and concerns expressed by a growing consensus of scientists who have been studying the question (as reflected, for instance, in the IPCC report). Gilbert is focused on a puzzle that begins at that point of departure: how can it be that such a significant problem could be so widely discounted and so easily eclipsed in policymaking agendas and public discourse by concerns that seem relatively small. As he explains, social psychology and a better understanding of human behavior helps to solve that puzzle. That is his point. It is about human psychology.

Friedman starts somewhere else, as does Levatter. They begin with the assumption that climate change, if real, should not be a significant concern. So, when Friedman is describing “imaginary perils,” and when Levatter asserts that “we are over-reacting to a minor threat,” they are challenging Gilbert at a place where he was not really focusing — the question of whether climate change poses any major threat that would require a significant policy response. To that extent, Friedman and Levatter are missing Gilbert’s point. (It is true that Friedman foments some doubts about Gilbert’s analysis, but Gilbert has more than adequately addressed those.)

There may be more going on in Friedman’s and Levatter’s responses. They, too, seem to be offering to resolve a puzzle — namely, how is it that the scientific community can be making headway in getting the public and lawmakers to take seriously a problem that, at most, looks like little more than a minor engineering task?

To resolve that puzzle, they also suggest a kind of psychological theory. Their implicit answer (which is intimated in their tone as much as it is by their arguments) seems to be that certain so-called scientists are bent on scaring us with their “over-heated but illogical rhetoric” about “imagined perils.” Friedman and Levatter seem to be suggesting that the real threat we face is not climate change but these ill-motivated or misinformed charlatans.

I, too, worry about charlatans. But that only begs the question: who does one trust? That’s a question that each of us should probably ponder.

I, for one, am inclined to trust the IPCC and the other climate scientists who seem to be telling us that the climate-change problem is more significant than many of us, including our lawmakers, have assumed. And as to why such a gap between the actual threat and the perceived threat may exist, I think Gilbert has brilliantly summarized an important part of the story by focusing on how evolution has shaped how we respond differently to different types of threats.

In addition, I believe that the gap is probably also attributable in part to the vocal and influential individuals and entities who have been busy assuring us that any problem we can’t clearly see is imagined, and any problem that doesn’t come with clear villains and simple, short-term solutions is not a problem worth our time.

So, in the end, I suppose I’m in partial agreement with Friedman and Levatter’s implied admonition: beware of charlatans.

The upper limit of the current IPCC estimate is a bit under a centimeter a year–say thirty centimeters in the next few decades. So you are either asserting that lower Manhattan is substantially less than thirty centimeters above sea level or that it is more likely that the IPCC has underestimated the rate of rise by about an order of magnitude than that there will be a shoe bomb incident. I’m pretty sure the former claim is false, and the latter seems at least dubious, especially when considering the near end of the period their estimate covers.

It is handy to have the IPCC estimates now, but they were not available when this essay was published last summer. But does it really matter if we’re talking about this block of Manhattan rather than that one? If it makes you happier, you can substitute your favorite likely-to-be-flooded place and read the essay again. The point remains that our government will spend more money fighting some small and unlikely threats (shoe-bombers) than some larger and more likely ones (climate change).

I will happily agree that humans are not entirely rational. But their failure to react decisively to imaginary perils–such as the near term flooding of lower Manhattan–is not evidence of it.

Human beings often fail to take action to prevent outcomes that are both terrible and foreseeable (“If I don’t save more money each month I will have to live on cat food when I’m old” or “If I keep forgetting to brush my teeth I will have painful dental problems later in life”). This is the hallmark of irrationality. If a person who will not get out of the path of an oncoming train — even when the train can’t yet be seen around the bend and even when there is some chance that it isn’t really oncoming — is not irrational, then what is she? Prudent?

The use of drugs isn’t visited on us by a brutal dictator or an evil empire, and yet the war on drugs has been one of this nation’s top priorities (unfortunately) for some decades now. When making generalizations, a modest effort to test them against reality is usually worth the trouble.

I said that people are designed to react more strongly to human than to nonhuman threats. You are merely pointing out that people can react to nonhuman threats too, which does not speak to my claim. (BTW, the Columbian cocaine cartels are probably better examples of evil empires than Russia was). Also, when you make sarcastic comments about the people you are criticizing (“When making generalizations…”) you undermine your own credibility and not theirs. Please stick to the issues.

Humans have moral feelings with regard to both pollution–note the adoption of a pejorative religious term to describe it–and waste. A very brief examination of modern literature and modern law on environmental issues suggests that environmentalism is driven mainly by moral and symbolic arguments, not practical ones–that, although there are real problems to be dealt with, our response looks more like a religious movement than a rational one.

I’m not sure what your point is here. Are you saying that people have the same visceral reaction to air pollution that they have to finding their father in bed with their sister? I argue that environmental problems don’t push our moral buttons as hard as incest does, and you respond by saying that environmental problems can push our moral buttons. Once again, I made a relative claim (X is bigger than Y) to which your response (Y is nonzero) is irrelevant.

The damage done by changes often depends on how fast they happen. A sea level rise of a meter in a week would cause substantial damage in parts of the U.S. and create massive problems in several other parts of the world. The same rise over a century represents an engineering problem rather less difficult than the one that the Dutch solved several centuries ago–with a much poorer society and a much more primitive technology than we have now.

I said that we are less likely to react to gradual than sudden changes. You note that gradual changes are sometimes less threatening than sudden ones. This is a nice observation but it does not challenge my point.

If we accept the IPCC estimates, that day would be about two degrees warmer than average. Sea levels would be about eighteen inches higher than they now are–considerably less than the current difference between low tide and high tide. Why would you expect him to be shocked and awed?

See first answer.

Your response is a lawyerly attempt to manufacture disagreement with details of sentences, but it ignores the essay’s main argument, which is: “People are designed by evolution to respond to threats with certain features and climate change doesn’t have them. This may help explain why we under-react to the serious threat that climate change poses.” If you have nothing to say to this other than “Your estimate for a particular block of Manhattan is off by several centimeters of water” then I’ve done my job well.

http://www.nasa.gov/images/content/161139main_hurricanes_nyc_lg.jpg

The substantial blue areas are areas that would flood under current circumstances due to storm surge from a category 3 hurricane. The much smaller red bits show the additional flooding if sea level were 37.5 cm higher than it now is. The almost invisible yellow bits show the further flooding at 47.2 cm.

“The odds of this happening in the next few decades are better than the odds that a disgruntled Saudi will sneak onto an airplane and detonate a shoe bomb.”

The upper limit of the current IPCC estimate is a bit under a centimeter a year–say thirty centimeters in the next few decades. So you are either asserting that lower Manhattan is substantially less than thirty centimeters above sea level or that it is more likely that the IPCC has underestimated the rate of rise by about an order of magnitude than that there will be a shoe bomb incident. I’m pretty sure the former claim is false, and the latter seems at least dubious, especially when considering the near end of the period their estimate covers.

I will happily agree that humans are not entirely rational. But their failure to react decisively to imaginary perils–such as the near term flooding of lower Manhattan–is not evidence of it.

“Global warming isn’t trying to kill us, and that’s a shame. If climate change had been visited on us by a brutal dictator or an evil empire, the war on warming would be this nation’s top priority.”

The use of drugs isn’t visited on us by a brutal dictator or an evil empire, and yet the war on drugs has been one of this nation’s top priorities (unfortunately) for some decades now. When making generalizations, a modest effort to test them against reality is usually worth the trouble.

“Although all human societies have moral rules about food and sex, none has a moral rule about atmospheric chemistry.”

Humans have moral feelings with regard to both pollution–note the adoption of a pejorative religious term to describe it–and waste. A very brief examination of modern literature and modern law on environmental issues suggests that environmentalism is driven mainly by moral and symbolic arguments, not practical ones–that, although there are real problems to be dealt with, our response looks more like a religious movement than a rational one.

“Because we barely notice changes that happen gradually, we accept gradual changes that we would reject if they happened abruptly.”

The damage done by changes often depends on how fast they happen. A sea level rise of a meter in a week would cause substantial damage in parts of the U.S. and create massive problems in several other parts of the world. The same rise over a century represents an engineering problem rather less difficult than the one that the Dutch solved several centuries ago–with a much poorer society and a much more primitive technology than we have now.

“If President Bush could jump in a time machine and experience a single day in 2056, he’d return to the present shocked and awed, prepared to do anything it took to solve the problem.”

If we accept the IPCC estimates, that day would be about two degrees warmer than average. Sea levels would be about eighteen inches higher than they now are–considerably less than the current difference between low tide and high tide. Why would you expect him to be shocked and awed?

In any case, thanks to David Yosifon for pointing me at the blog.